New Book Highlights Iraq Plan That Went Awry; Bush Doesn't Remember

After recounting American efforts to remove members of the Baath Party of Saddam Hussein from civilian agencies (an initiative Bremer says came from the Pentagon), Mr. Bremer told Mr. Bush that he would “parallel this step with an even more robust measure” to dismantle the Iraq military.

One day later, Mr. Bush wrote back a short thank you letter. “Your leadership is apparent,” the president wrote. “You have quickly made a positive and significant impact. You have my full support and confidence.”

Bremer, a civilian, was spurred to action by yet another Beltway Book, Dead Certain: The Presidency of George W. Bush by Robert Draper (buy the book):

“The policy had been to keep the army intact; didn’t happen,” Bush told biographer Robert Draper in excerpts published in Sunday's New York Times.

Draper pressed Bush to explain why, if he wanted to maintain the army, his chief administrator for Iraq, L. Paul Bremer III, issued an order in May 2003 disbanding the 400,000-strong army without pay.

"Yeah, I can't remember; I'm sure I said, 'This is the policy, what happened?' " Bush said, adding: "Again, Hadley's got notes on all this stuff" -- a reference to national security advisor Stephen J. Hadley.

According to Douglas J. Feith, then Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, the plan to maintain the Army had been based on CIA information.

CNN reported on 23 May 2003 that an Administration spokesman explained: "These actions are part of a robust campaign to show the Iraqi people that the Saddam regime is gone and will never return."

But the plan was, apparently, symbolic. Most Iraqi military forces -- conscripts -- had simply gone home. There was no Army to maintain. At least that was the story at the time.

Slocombe Talks
In June 2003, the US announced it would begin building a 40,000-strong army in Iraq, with 12,000 troops to be in place by year's end. This is an order of magnitude fewer soldiers than there were in the Army we disbanded. And far less than we are still trying to train for hand-over.

Leading this effort: Walter Slocombe -- senior adviser for national security and defense.

In a 2004 PBS interview, Slocombe answered the question that Bush doesn't remember. In the interview, Slocombe described his role as "[being responsible] for, so to speak, the past, present and future of the Iraqi military."

[T]he United States government had expected that there would be substantial Iraqi military units which were intact ... That just didn't happen. The entire Iraqi army vaporized. They simply all went home as the fighting went forward.

[...]

And then a lot of the stuff that was in the facilities was stolen; almost all the nontactical vehicles, trucks, jeeps, cars, that kind of stuff were almost stolen. And then almost every government-related facility in Iraq was ransacked and looted by the local population. So the military bases practically, without exception, were in ruins.

But a contrarian view was put forth in May by Nir Rosen. He claims that the Army was "the most nationalist institution in the country" and that soldiers were proud to be part of the Army. "In electing not to fight U.S. forces, the army was expecting to be recognized by the occupation -- and indeed, until Bremer arrived, it appeared that many soldiers and officers were hoping to cooperate with the Americans."

Flashback to 2000
In September 2000, Slocombe, then Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (the position later held by Feith), detailed how the Pentagon was "managing the Iraq problem" in an appearance before the Senate Armed Services Committee (pdf). He also said (emphasis added):

[W]e need to recognize that there are no military solutions to many of the problems in dealing with Iraq and that military over-reaction would disserve our interests and needlessly endanger our personnel.

[...]

The key to our efforts in the region is the support of the coalition of nations who share our determination to contain Iraqi aggression, prevent acquisition of WMD capabilities, and to improve the lives of the Iraqi people – and ultimately see a different regime in Baghdad.

[...]

Our overall policy toward Iraq has been successful in containing Iraqi aggression... It is a policy that has required and will continue to require patience, tact, and perseverance.

There's another show that bears watching. It's called "What Was Said Before (aka "One Story Is Not Like The Other").

Nevertheless, this little skirmish demonstrates how unlikely it is that normal folk will ever know what really happened -- and what really was anticipated or planned for -- in Iraq.

Dead Certain: The Presidency of George W. Bush

By Robert Draper

Buy the book!