Help America Vote Act - HAVA

The Help America Vote Act contained no federal mandate for a paper back-up to electrons, despite the fact that the Act encouraged state governments to shift to electronic voting machines. In fact, almost one-third of Americans cast a ballot in the 2004 election with little, if any, way to determine if the vote recorded (or counted) was the one cast. Many of these voters cast their ballots on faith.

We are the only major democracy to allows private corporations to secretly count and tabulate votes with proprietary non-transparent software. In October 2005, the GAO issued a report detailing specific instances of e-voting problems in the 2004 election.

GAO - in a damning but understated manner - reported that in 2004 "[c]ast ballots, ballot definition files, and audit logs could be modified" (p 2). Specifically (p 7):

(1) some electronic voting systems did not encrypt cast ballots or system audit logs, and it was possible to alter both without being detected; (2) it was possible to alter the files that define how a ballot looks and works so that the votes for one candidate could be recorded for a different candidate; and (3) vendors installed uncertified versions of voting system software at the local level.

Specific instances of error included operational error (systems unavailable), voters being presented with the wrong ballot, and an undervote of 80 percent in one Pennsylvania county (the result of improper programming). In Maryland, a tabulation computer was connected directly to the Internet without security patches

The most troubling voting technology used in 2004 was a Direct Recording Electronic (DRE) System; this electronic voting system usually has no paper trail. GAO reports that only about 12 percent of us used DREs in the 2000 elections, but almost one-third of us did in 2004. In other words, almost one-third of Americans cast a ballot in the 2004 election with little, if any, way to determine if the vote recorded (or counted) was the one cast.

As the GAO reports, in 2004, these systems were vulnerable: "vendors installed uncertified versions of voting system software at the local level."

Before the fiasco that was the 2000 election, most local governments that had an "electronic" voting system used optical scan technology. Not unlike standardized tests, with optical scan, technology is used to count paper ballots. About 31 percent of us cast votes in this manner in 2000. Even though this system is far less expensive than DREs, the money that the federal government threw at local governments did little to boost its use: only an estimated 35 percent of us cast votes like this in 2004. (p 13-15)

According to The Free Press, "The United States is the only major democracy that allows private partisan corporations to secretly count and tabulate the votes with proprietary non-transparent software."

Many voters are turning to permanent absentee ballots as a way to make voting more convenient; this has the added benefit of providing a "verifiable" paper trail. In fact, Oregon has instituted voting by mail in lieu of traditional polling places.


See HAVA Overview, Voter Identification Requirements