Page 3 of 3, by Dr. Joe P. Dunn
Three weeks ago when I originally drafted this piece, I concluded that we could not leave Iraq in the mess that we had wrought. That judgment is now passé. The Lebanon situation has changed the calculus. Hezbollah sustained losses but gained stature. Qana and the devastation inflicted on hapless Lebanese civilians undermined the moral standing that Israel gained from the merciless terrorist rocket attacks. U.S. unqualified support for Israeli actions hurt us gravely in the region even with the moderate Sunni regimes who detest Hezbollah. The insurgents in Iraq benefited, and the faltering Shia-led Iraqi government may not be redeemable. The military situation in Baghdad is increasingly precarious.
The politically-motivated desire to draw down American forces in Iraq, a ploy for the fall elections as duplicitous as those during Vietnamization, is dead. Bush faces Johnson's earlier dilemma. The inadequate force commitments made respectively in 1965 and 2003 ordained our inevitable failures. In both cases, more able leaders were necessary, but maybe neither conflict was winnable within the parameters that this nation was willing to, or should, endure. The first law of strategy is to know the maximum that you are willing to pay to achieve an objective.
The window of opportunity when greater troop commitment might have made a difference has closed. Failure to convert from invasion-occupation mode to counterinsurgency strategy at an early point was a cardinal error. The two approaches are vastly different in the number of troops committed, how they are employed, how they work at the grassroots level, and rules of engagement. In Vietnam, by the time we finally got serious about a counterinsurgency strategy, it was too late. To the extent that we have belatedly started to think in these terms in Iraq and provide some level of training to our forces on the ground, it is probably also well past when it might have made a difference.
Bush supporters babble about staying the course and the consequences of failure in Iraq. No question that consequences exist. The issue isn't whether we should "stay the course" at whatever cost, but whether it is even possible. The failure rests squarely on the administration's shoulders. Our military is not constituted to be in this conflict interminably. We have one-third of our available combat forces committed in Iraq and Afghanistan, one-third just returned and awaiting redeployment (often for third tours), and one-third immediately preparing to go. This strain on our limited manpower cannot go on endlessly. Moreover, the administration has failed to provide adequate funding for equipment replacement. In the harsh physical environments, equipment is rapidly degraded and demands repair and replacement. The administration has provided approximately half the funding necessary for replacement tanks, vehicles, and other necessities. Reserve forces have been stripped of vital equipment already so many units train without the infrastructure that they will need on the ground. The Joint Chiefs report that not one of our Army reserve units meets preparedness standards to go into combat.
In Vietnam, we intervened in a nationalist revolution. In Iraq, we are caught in an ideological and sectarian religious war. When Walter Chronkite turned against Vietnam in 1968, Johnson knew that the war's sustainability was over. George Will's dyspeptic commentary on Bush and Iraq this week reflected the conservative abandonment that may be the Chronkite equivalent.
Our brave military personnel who are asked to bear the costs of fool's errands deserve better. I did when I fought in Vietnam, and today my son, a young military officer, does as well.
Dr. Joe P. Dunn is the Charles A. Dana Professor and Chair of History & Politics at Converse College. He has published many articles and two books on the Vietnam War, including his own memoir, and has written and spoken extensively on Middle East conflict.
This op-ed first appeared in the Spartanburg (SC) Herald-Journal on Sunday 6 August 2006; block-quoted material did not appear in the original. Posted with permission of author.