Nigerian Yellow Cake

2002 Continued

All the while, the CIA analyst and the INR (State) analyst disagreed whether Niger could supply Iraq with yellowcake. The CIA said "yes" and INR said "no." (47)

A 10 May 2002 CIA briefing book said that a "foreign government service says Iraq was trying to acquire 500 tons of uranium from Niger."

A 24 June 2002 cable from the US Embassy in Niger said that Niger had signed a comprehensive agreement with IAEA to help ensure Niger's uranium was used only for "peaceful purposes."

On 22 July 2002 the DOE published an intelligence product which said that Iraq might be trying to reconstitute its nuclear program, citing the alleged Niger deal.

On 1 August 2002, the CIA published a paper on weapons of mass destruction in Iraq; this paper did not reference the Niger information.

In September 2002, a DIA intelligence assessment outlined Iraq's plans to rebuild its nuclear program. This document said, "Iraq has been vigorously trying to procure uranium ore and yellowcake." This clearly overstates the evidence presented to date. (48)

On 11 September 2002, the National Security Council (NSC) contacted the CIA to clear language for possible use in a statement by the president. The language cleared by the CIA: (49)

"Iraq has made several attempts to buy high strength aluminum tubes used in centrifuges to enrich uranium for nuclear weapons. And we know this: within the past few years, Iraq has resumed efforts to obtain large quantities of a type of uranium oxide known as yellowcake, which is an essential ingredient in this process. The regime was caught trying to purchase up to 500 metric tons of this material. It takes about 10 tons to produce enough enriched uranium for a single nuclear weapon."

This statement, too, clearly overstates the intelligence as presented to the Senate. It was not used publicly.

On 24 September 2002, the British issued a white paper which stated: "[T]there is intelligence that Iraq has sought the supply of significant quantities of uranium from Africa." (50)

Concurrent with the British report, NSC contacted the CIA to have another statement cleared. The cleared statement:

"We also have intelligence that Iraq has sought large amounts of uranium and uranium oxide, known as yellowcake, from Africa. Yellowcake is an essential ingredient in the process to enrich uranium for nuclear weapons."

This statement more closely reflects the intelligence as presented to the Senate. It was not used publicly.

Sometime in September, in a discussion between analysts from the CIA and the NSC, the CIA analyst told the Senate that he suggested removing the reference to Africa; in response, the NCA analyst said this would leave the British "flapping in the wind." In a written statement, the NCS analyst told the Senate that the CIA analyst did not make this suggestion and denied the "flapping in the wind" comment. (51)

There is no explanation, in the Senate report, of how the draft National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) of 25 September 2002 reduced the complexity and disagreement about intelligence on Iraq and Niger to this stark assertion: (52)

Iraq is described as "vigorously" attempting to buy yellowcake... that as of 2001, Iraq and Niger were "reportedly" working out details of a deal for "up to 500 tons of yellowcake"... and that Iraq had reportedly tried to buy uranium from Somalia and the Democratic Republic of the Congro.

However, the Senate report states that it was the aluminum tube purchase that was the focus of the report and debate about the draft language. However, the State Department dissent on the uranium consensus was "inadvertently" moved to another section of the report (instead of being printed alongside the disputed information about purchasing yellowcake from Niger, the dissent appeared 60 pages later). The theory about the aluminun tube purchase, also, was subsequently debunked. (53, 63)

What is absolutely impossible for me to understand is this: a 4 October 2002 draft of a Presidential speech asserted that "the regime (Iraq) has been caught attempting to purchase up to 500 metric tons of uranium oxide from Africa -- an essential ingredient in the enrichment process." (55) The CIA objected (56), asking that the sentence be removed because

"the amount is in dispute and it is debatable whether it can be acquired from the source. We told Congress that the Brits have exaggerated this issue. Finally, the Iraqis already have 550 metric tons of uranium oxide in their inventory."

On 6 October 2002, the CIA elaborated on why the sentence should be removed: (56)

The evidence is weak ...The procurement is not particularly significant to Iraq's nuclear ambitions because the Iraqis already have a large stock of uranium oxide in their inventory ... and we have shared points one and two with Congress, telling them the Africa story is overblown and telling them this one of the two issues where we differed with the British."