Nothing describes the pain, anguish and heartache of the "war against terror" like the story of Pat Tillman. No other story so vividly illustrates military error, bumbling and cover-up. The Pentagon recently launched another investigation into Tillman's death. Almost a year ago, the Washington Post explored Tillman's death by friendly fire on an Afghanistan hillside. The original Pentagon story, on 22 April 2004, was that Tillman was struck by enemy fire, while getting out of a vehicle, and later died at a field hospital.

Dozens of witness statements, e-mails, investigation findings, logbooks, maps and photographs obtained by The Washington Post show that Tillman died unnecessarily following botched communications, a mistaken decision to split his platoon over the objections of its leader, and negligent shooting by pumped-up young Rangers — some in their first firefight — who failed to identify their targets as they blasted their way out of a frightening ambush.

The truth remains elusive. Another military investigation was launched in August. A recent San Francisco Chronicle review of the 2,000+ pages of testimony to date comes to a different conclusion than the official line in January. Coupled with interviews with family members and soldiers who served with Tillman, the Chronicle "found contradictions, inaccuracies and what appears to be the military’s attempt at self-protection."

That pretty much sums up the fall 2004 investigation by the Washington Post. Key questions remain unanswered. For example, Tillman's family wants to know: "When did top Pentagon officials know that Tillman’s death was caused by friendly fire, and why did they delay for five weeks before informing his family?"

"There have been so many discrepancies so far that it’s hard to know what to believe," his mother said.

The first military investigation was launched 24 hours after Tillman's death on 22 April 2004. On that day, 23 April, "all top Ranger commanders were told of the suspected fratricide," according to the Chronicle review. Less than a week later, 29 April, Gen. John Abizaid, chief of U.S. Central Command, as well as other commanders, were told of the fratricide. According to the Chronicle, the first, damning, report was released 4 May, the day after Tillman's nationally televised memorial.

And yet, the public story, that Tillman had died heroically on the battlefied, remained unchanged for five weeks. "President Bush hailed him as 'an inspiration on and off the football field, as with all who made the ultimate sacrifice in the war on terror.'"

Investigation Results
The first investigator "determined that soldiers involved in the incident had committed 'gross negligence' and should be appropriately disciplined." According to the Chronicle, a second investigation was launched by a higher ranking officer, who recommended less severe punishment. The Post reports only one investigative report during this period; it was delivered on 8 May to Col. James Nixon, the 75th Ranger Regiment's commander. Nixon was formally charged with running the case that same day.

According to the Post, Gen. John Abizaid, CENTCOM's commander in chief, approved the investigation's conclusions 28 May (under an aide's signature). On 29 May, Lt. Gen. Philip R. Kensinger Jr. made the first public announcement that Tillman had probably been killed by friendly fire.

A followup investigation was initiated by the Pentagon only at the urging of Sen. John McCain (R-AZ). The first investigator charged that higher ranking officers allowed soliders to signficantly change their testimony (the deleted text, below, has been redacted ... even a public press release had been redacted when given to the family):

"They had the entire chain of command (inaudible) that were involved, the [deleted], all sticking up for [deleted] … And the reason the [deleted] called me in … because the [deleted] … changed their story in how things occurred and the timing and the distance in an attempt to stick up for their counterpart, implied, insinuated that the report wasn’t as accurate as I submitted it …" the first investigator testified.

In another section of his testimony, he said witnesses changed details regarding "the distance, the time, the location and the positioning" in Tillman’s killing.

Who Split the Unit?
A key question that remains unresolved is who decided to split the unit into two groups and send them into enemy territory with a disabled vehicle. From Spc. Russell Baer, who was also stuck on the hill near Tillman:

Why they thought that moving us out in broad daylight from our position, dragging a busted humvee slowly through a known hotspot after we had been stranded there all day was a good idea will forever elude me. Who made that decision? Bailey? Saunders? That’s what I want to know.

The Washington Post report, also based on redacted millitary documents, suggested the decision was made solely to keep to a schedule:

According to investigative records, a senior officer in the Rangers' operations center [far away at Bagram, near Kabul], whose name is edited out of documents obtained by The Post, complained pointedly to A Company's commander, Uthlaut's immediate superior.

"This vehicle problem better not delay us any more," the senior officer said, as he later recalled in a sworn statement. The 2nd Platoon was already 24 hours behind schedule, he said. It was supposed to be conducting clearing operations in Manah, a southeastern Afghan village.

The 2nd Platoon commander -- Lt. David Uthlaut, a recent graduate of West Point -- objected to the decision to split the group. In an e-mail to the operations center, dated 5.03 pm, he said: "I would recommend sending our whole platoon up to the highway and then having us go together to the villages." Splitting the platoon would be fruitless because it would be dark before the group could reach Manah, and procedures prohibited search operations after dark.

The fact that this question remains unanswered, after multiple investigations into what went wrong that day, is tremendously troubling -- particularly since redacted testimony suggests names have been named. Isn't there a chain of command for a reason?

It is equally troubling that Uthlaut's superior, when faced with a perjury charge, was allowed to change his testimony. A 3 March 2005 memo from Brig. Gen. Gary Jones (who conducted the January 2005 investigation) asserts that Capt. William Saunders, the commander of Tillman's company, was able to skirt perjury charges. He had originally claimed that he had told his superiors of Uthlaut's e-mail protesting the division of his men. He was allowed to change his testimony to avoid the perjury charge and he was granted immunity.

Tillman's father draws the only logical conclusion: "The administration clearly was using this case for its own political reasons. This cover-up started within minutes of Pat’s death, and it started at high levels. This is not something that (lower-ranking) people in the field do.”

In January 2005, the Pentagon concluded that there was no "cover-up" -- and yet the official testimony leads to a different conclusion for the family and third party analysts. This apparant lack of accountability at higher levels of command reflects the same lack of accountability in the Abu Grahib atrocities (which were made public shortly after Tillman's death). Who guards the hen house?

SFC Tip to Ragged Thots

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